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RECENT CASES
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION--OFFER OF PART IN SETrLEMENT-EFFEC 
OF
ACCrPTANcE-The defendant, plaintiff's agent, sent to plaintiff a statement of
account, stating that a check was enclosed in settlement of that account. After
a bona fide dispute as to the amount due, and with knowledge that defendant
claimed the amount of the check to be the true amount due, plaintiff cashed the
check and sued for a balance claimed. The defendant claimed an accord and
satisfaction. Held: Judgment for defendant. -Egan v. Crowther, District Court
of Appeals of California, August 5, 1925.
Vhere a claim is unliquidated, or in dispute, payment and acceptance, in
satisfaction, of a sum less than that claimed, operates as an accord and satis-
faction. Nassoiy v. Tomlinso,, 148 N. Y. 326, 42 N. E. 715 (1896); Hull v.
Johnson, 22 R. I. 66, 46 Ad. x82 (igoo). To achieve this result, the money
must be offered in full satisfaction of the demand, and the accompanying acts
and declarations must be such that the creditor must understand that he is to
accept the money in full satisfaction only. Steidtmann t. Joseph Lay Co., 234
II. 84, 84 N. E. 640 (iqo8) ; Rose v. American Paper Co., 83 N. J. L 707, 8S
At. 354 (1912) ; Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N. Y. 231, 33 N. E. io34 (1893). If this
has been done, there is a good accord and satisfaction, even though the creditor
immediately notifies the debtor that the check is accepted only in part payment
and demands the balance. Barham v. Bank of Delight, 94 Ark. z58, z26 S. W.
394 (910). Where a dispute has arisen and a check is sent "in full"; McKenty
,. Oceanus Mfg. Co., 123 N. Y. Supp. 983 (1910) ; Connecticut River Lumber
Co. v. Brown, 68 Vt. 239, 35 At. 56 (1895) ; or "to balance account"; Lafrents
& Karstens Co. v. Catanagh, x66 Ill. App. 3o6 (19t) ; Aydlett v. Brown, 153
N. C. 334, 69 S. E. 243 (19io) ; it is held a good accord and satisfaction.
In the instant case, the fact that the. dispute did not arise until after the
check was sent was considered immaterial, as the plaintiff cashed it knowing
that the defendant had offered it in full satisfaction. Two New York cases
seem to require the controversy to have arisen first, and the check to have been
sent expressly to settle the controversy. Eames Vacuum Brake Co. v. Prosser,
157 N. Y. 289, 51 N. E. 986-(1898) ; Laroe v. Sugar Loaf Dairy Co., I8o N.
Y. 367, 73 N. E. 61 (Ipo5). It is believed, however, that these cases are dis-
tinguishable on their facts, and that the instant case is in accord with the gen-
erally accepted view, as shown in Nassoiy z% Tomlinson, supra.
BANxiupTcy-LIABIUTY TO INVOLUNTARY PROCMEDINGS--STATt'S OF CO-
OPMATIVE MARKETING AsSoCATIoN-The defendant association was incor-
porated under an Indiana statute proliding for the incorpation'of non-profit, co-
operative associations, and was engaged in co-operative marketing of dairy
products. This was a petition for involuntary bankruptcy, the answer to which
denied that the defendant association was subject to the provisions of the bank-
ruptcy laws of the United States. Held: Petition dismissed. In rt Dairy Afar-




.The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, c. 541, § 4, 3o Stat. 547i as amended by 
the
Act of 1910, C. 412 § '3, 4, 36 Stat. 839, provides that "any moneyed, 
business
or commercial corporation except a municipal, railroad, insurance 
or banking
corporation" may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt. This 
provision is to
be strictly construed and includes only such corporations as are 
clearly within
the classes enumerated. In re New York, Neu' Jersey Ice Lines. 47 Fed. 214
(C. C. A.. 19o6). Whether or not a corporation is subject to the 
Act depends
upon the business it actually transacts and not on the powers 
granted by its
charter- In re Kingston Realty Co., i6o Fed. 445 (C. C. 
A., i9o8). Where
the business of a corporation includes some pursuits within 
and others without
the operation of the Act, the principal business done determines 
the character
of the corporation. Cae v. Connel, 773 Fed. 445 (C. 
C. A., i9o9) ; In" re
QUimby Co., 126 Fed. 167 (C. C. A., i9o3) ; In re Interstate Paving 
Co., 171
Fed. 6o4 (D. C., o969).
There are no decisions construing the terms "moneyed, business 
or com-
mercial corporations" as used in the present Act. The same 
words were, how-
ever, used in the Act of 1867, C. 176, § 37, 14 Stat. 535, and have 
been con-
strued many times. Every corporation which transacts business 
for gain as its
chief and ultimate purpose is a business corporation. In "e 
Radke Co., im9
Fed. 735 (D. C., 19ti). The words "moneyed, busince5 
r Commercial cor-
porations" are intended to embrace all those classes of corporations 
that deal
in .r ,t mabney or property in the transactions of money, business 
or com-
merce for pecuniary gain. Winter v. Iowa Ry., 2 Dill 487 (U. S. C. C., 1873).
The essential element is the transaction of business for pecuniary 
gain. RankiU
v. Florida Ry., Fed. Cas. No. 11567 (D. C., x868) ; Adams %. Boston 
Ry., Fed.
Cas. No. 47 (D. C., 1870) ; In re Radke Co., supra; Bumip, 
BANKRuPTCY, 792
(ioth Ed., 1877).
In the instant case, while the defendant association bought 
and sold milk
cans and dealt in other personal property, it was primarily 
engaged in the
co-operative marketing of dairy products. The purpose of the 
association was
the promotion of the common interests of the members, but 
the immediate ob-
ject was not pecuniary gain. The decision therefore seems 
in accord with
the intention of Congress, and justified by -the authorities.
BANXS AND BANKzNG-DA. AGES FOR BREACH OF CoNTRAcr 
TO Hooi
CHECK-MENTAL PAIN AND SUFFERING AS ELEmIdET-The 
defendant bank
agreed to honor the plaintiff's checks while he was on his 
vacation in California.
Checks were subsequently dishonored, and plaintiff sued 
for the breach of the
contract. The jury returned a verdict assessing damages 
for loss of expenses
at $7oo. and for humiliation and mental suffering at 
$ooo. The lower court
set aside the item of damage for mental suffering. Held: 
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded, with instructions to enter judgment 
upon the verdict in
its entirety. f'estesen v. Clothe State Bank, Supreme 
Court of Colorado, No-
vember 2, 1925
Mental suffering, as an .element of damage arising from 
failure to meet a
contractual obligation, is usually regarded as too 
remote to be recoverable.
Smith v. Sanborn State Bank, 147 Iowa 640, 126 N. W. 
779 (igo) ; Americas
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National Bank v. Morey, 113 Ky. 85, 69 S. W. 759 (19o2). There are, how-
ever, special circumstances where recovery has been allowed. In Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Wells, 5o Fla. 474, 39 So. 838 (xgo5), the defendant refused to pay
over money to plaintiff in accordance with the contract, its agent knowing that
failure to pay would result in the plaintiff traveling for twenty-four hours
without funds. It was held that damages for mental suffering attendant on 
the
physical discomfort which followed could be recovered.
The grounds of the present decision are that the defendant bank knew that.
the plaintiff intended to use his credit for vacation expenses; that the refusal to
honor the checks left him without funds in a strange community; and that
humiliation and mental suffering were therefore the natural and probable con-
sequence of defendant's wilful act.
This case thus goes even farther than Western Union Tel. Co. v. Wells,
supra, for here there is no physical injury--an element of damage which sounds
more in tort than in contract. It has been held that substantial damages may
be recovered for the failure of a bank to honor a check though no pecuniary
loss be shown. Patterson v. Marine National Bank, 130 Pa. 419 (889), i8 At.
632. It has also been held that damage to business reputation resulting from
such dishonor will be compensated. Spearing v. Whitney-Central National
Bank, 129 La. 6o7, s6 So. 548 (x9ii). But in no other case has mental suffer-
ing been allowed as an element of such compensation, and on its facts the in-
stant case is contra to both the Kentucky and the Iowa cases cited above. In
thus extending the basis of recovery, it is submitted, the court goes far toward
allowing as an element of damage a condition hitherto regarded as too remote
to be compensated.
CAmuRias-DuTv To TaasPAssERs o0z TtAix-LIAMIuTY THaoUcH Na=-
GE-cE-Due to the failure of the defendant's engineer to observe a signal, the
train which he was handling collided with one on which the plaintiff's deceased
was a trespasser. Held: Recovery allowed. Bremer v. Lake Erie & IW. R. R.,
148 N. E. 86z (Ill., 1925).
It is a well-accepted principle that a trespasser on the carrier's cars or
premises is entitled to no protection from the carrier, except against wanton or
willful injury to him, or in other words, that the carrier exercise ordinary care
to avoid injuring him after discovering his presence. Biournquist v. R. R., 185
Mass. 130, 7o N. E. 53 (194); Van Ostrand v. R. R., 112 App. Div. 783, 99
N. Y. Supp. 548 (i9o6); Schifalacqua v. R. R., 249 Pa. 6o2, 95 Ad. 26o (i9'5).
See io C. J. 876.
The trespasser in the instant case was neither known nor expected to be
on the train. Faced with a line of its own cases holding that knowledge of the
trespasser's presence is necessary, the court draws a distinction between tres-
passers on tracks and similar property and trespassers on trains, and holds that
the cases of the former class do not apply to the latter situation. It disposes
of the second objection by simply disregarding it. It does so by a mere restate-
ment of the duty which a carrier owes to expected trespassers.
After speaking of the presumption of willfulness and constructive willful-
ness, it states that "the observance of duty (to notice signals) was essential to
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the safety of the trains and all persons and property on them." Liability is thus
flatly placed on the ground of a duty towards trespassers, to use ordinary 
care
in the operation of its trains whether their presence is known or not.
As has been pointed out by Professor Bohlen, the high degree 
of duty to
use care imposed upon carriers is justifiable only on the ground 
that the relation-
ship is one voluntarily entered into, from which the carrier 
receives a benefit.
Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Low of Torts, 
53 U. OF P.
L. REv. 209, 220 (i9o5). To impose the duty to use care in 
a case like the
present, when there is neither a voluntary relationship nor 
a benefit, seems to
be an unwarranted extension of the carrier's liability.
CONTRAcT--TRMAINATION-RIGHT OF ONE PARTY TO 
RFSCIND Wrrif-
ouT MUTUAL AssENT-The defendant railroad contracted 
with plaintiff town-
ship to share in ,he upkeep of a bridge used by the public and 
the defendant
jointly. The defendant later gave up use of the bridge owing 
to its insufi-
ciency to carry modern equipment. Held: Contract terminated when 
defendant
was compelled to discontinue use of bridge, although plaintiffs did 
not assent
thereto. Readsboro v. Hoosoc Tunnel & W. R. Co., 6 Fed. (2d) 
733, (C. C.
A., z925).
A contract not calling for personal service or special confidence, in which
the date of termination is not fixed, is presumed to be interminable 
and irrevo-
cable, and unless that presumption is rebutted the contract is terminable 
only
by mutual assent. Lianelly R. R. v. London, etc., R. R., 7 Eng. and 
Irish App.
550 (1875); Franklin Tel. Co. v. Harrison, 145 U. S. 
459 (1892); McKell v.
Chesapeake, etc., R. Co., 175 Fed. 321 (C. C. A., x9o).
But when, from the nature and purpose of the contract, it may be 
reason-
ably implied that the intention of the parties was that the contract 
should re-
main in force only so long as the parties shared the benefits to flow from 
it,
then, when such benefit to one of the parties has ceased, he may terminate 
the
contract upon reasonable notice, without the concurrence of the other. 
Barmy
v. Indiana Ry., 157 Ind. 228, 61 N. E. 194 (i9o) ; Philadelphia & Reading 
R.
R. v. River Front R. R., 168 Pa. 357, 31 AtI. so98 (1895); Stonega Coke
Coal Co. v. Louisville & N. R. R., io6 Va. 223, 55 S. B. 551 (ixo6).
It is submitted that the instant case was properly decided under this rule.
The intention of the parties was clearly that the defendant, in return for 
the
use of the bridge, which accelerated its deterioration, should share in the 
cost of
maintenance. When, however, it became impossible, through economic 
exigen-
cies, for the defendant to continue the use of the bridge it would be mani-
festly unfair to hold it bound by a contract the essence of which was mutual
use and resulting mutual liability.
CRIMINAL LAw-CoNFESSiONS TO ONE IN AUTHORITY-BURDEN OF 
PROOF
TO Snow VOLUNTARY NATuRE-The defendant was accused of owning and 
op-
erating a "moonshine" still. Over objection the prosecution offered in evidence
a confession of the accused, without proof that it had been given voluntarily.
The accused denied the confession and said, without contradiction, that he 
had
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been beaten by his jailor for refusing to make such a statement. The court
admitted the confession, and the defendant was convicted and appealed. 
Held:
New trial granted. State t,. Zaccario, 129 S. E. 763 (V. Va-, z925).
A confession made to one in authority is inadmissible unless made volun-
tarily but there is a conflict of authority as to the party upon whom falls 
the
burden of proving the confession voluntary. Professor Wignore believes 
that
the more practical rule would be to receive confessions without question, unless
they are shown to have been improperly induced. 2 WIGmoRE, EvIDEN.CE, (2d
ed., 1923) 215. See 16 C. J. 733, n. 94, for a list of jurisdictions accepting this
rule. The majority of jurisdictions, including the Federal courts, however, hold
that the prosecution in offering a confession must show that it w.as made 
with-
out compulsion, at least from the person to whom it was made. Hopi v,. Utah,
11O U. S.'574 (1884); State z, Thoa., 250 Mo. 189, 157 S. W. 330 (913);
Thompson's Case, 20 Gratt. 724 (Va., 1870).
In Pennsylvania, the question of the admissibility of a confession is pri-
marily for the court, but it may properly be left to the jury, if there is conflict-
ing evidence. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 178 Pa. 409, 35 Adt. 9z4 (i86); Com-
monwealth '. Spardute, 278 Pa. 37, 122 At. 161 (1923). The question of which
party has the burden of the proof does not seem to have arisen.
Wigmore, in Confessions, A Brief History and a Criticism, 33
Am. L REv. 376 (1899), gives the historical reasons for the strictness of the
limitations on the admissibility of confessions, and states his belief that with
the disappearance of the reasons for the limitations the limitations should 
dis-
appear also. The West Virginia court in the present case feels that good
reason still exists for retaining the strict limitations. While on the surface
Professor Wigmore's statement, that the accused should have the burden of the
proof,' because he knows best whether inducements have been offered, seems
reasonable, still the person who obtains the confession is in just as good a posi-
tion as the accused to know whether it has been offered. Moreover, since the
statements of officers of the law are apt to carry greater weight than those
of the accused, it is only just to place upon the former the duty of establish-
ing the case.
HOMESTEAD LAw-NATvaE OF VETERA.'S RIGHT-INrERrRETATION OF
STATUTs-A Civil War veteran, entitled under Act of 1872, 31 Stat. 847, c.
338, § j. U. S. Comp. Stat. § 4592, to a homestead entry of i6o acres, 
died hav-
ing entered only eighty acres. Sections 2 and 3, U. S. Comp. Stat. §§ 4594,
4602, further provide that his widow, and at her death, his minor 
children
through their guardian, should be entitled to exercise his right to enter the
additional eighty acres, should he have failed to do so. No entry was made until
after the widow was dead and the children were all of age. The children then
made a joint assignment to the plaintiff, who finally made the entry. Held:
The assignment operated to convey the right to enter the eighty acres. Ander-
son 2%'. Clune, 46 Sup. Ct. 69 (1925).
The rule obtaining in the past was contrary to the instant decision. The
Secretary of the Interior had decided that this right lapsed if not exerct;ed'or
assigned by the soldier, his widow, or his orphan children before their majority.
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46 L. D. 32 (1917). Both federal and state courts, however, had held before
this that the right to enter the additional acreage was- a propeity right and
could be assigned before entry was made upon the land. Webster v. Luther,
163 U. S. 331 (896) ; Mullen v. Wine, 26 Fed. 266 (C. C., z886) ; Barnes v.
Poirier, 64 Fed. 14 (C. C. A., 78g4); Montgomery v. Pacific Coast Land Bu-
reau, 94 Cal. 284, 29 Pac. 64o (1892) ; Webster r. Luther, 5o Minn. 77, 52 N. W.
271 (x892) ; Knight v. Leary, 54 Wis. 459, 1i N. W. 6oo (1882). The prin-
cipal case merely takes the next logical step in holding that this right may be
inherited-that it passes as other personal property, to the personal estate of
the soldier immediately upon his death, subject only to the exercise of the
rights given to the widow and the minor orphan children. Thus, of course,
an assignment by the children after they had come of age would convey the
soldier's right of entry.
Although this is a liberal interpretation, it is consistent with the spirit
of the statute, and in line with the policy of favoring veterans and their fami-
lies.
INcOME TAx-IzsuANcE-WHAT RaEsRvE FU NDS AR DEnucrmxz-Rz-
sEmv-In pursuance of the requirements of the Superintendent of Insurance of
New York, the plaintiff insurance company made a net addition to its reserve
funds to cover accrued but unsettled loss claims. The revenue-collector re-
fused to deduct such fund from the gross income of the company in order to
determine the net sum subject to taxation. Held: The permitted deductions
specified by Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756, § 12, do not necessarily include every-
thing which may be denominated reserve fund by state statute or officers. The
reserve fund of the act does not include money held by a fire and marine in-
surance company to cover accrued but unsettled claims for losses. United
States v. Boston Ins. Co., 46 Sup. Ct. 97 (1925).
The Court states, as a reason for its holding, that the Act of Congress
deals with reserves, not particularly in their bearing upon the solvency of the
company, as the state statutes do, but only as they aid in determining what part
of the gross income ought to be treated as net income for purposes of taxation.
The court expressly adheres to and affirms the doctrine laid down in McCoach
V. Ins. Co., 244.U. S. 585 (1917). Maryland Casualty Co. V. U. S., 251 U. S.
342 (19zo), holds, contrary to the principal case, that a finding, that the In-
surance Department of Pennsylvania, pursuant to statute, has at all time re-
quired the insurance company to keep on hand, as a condition of doing busi-
ness in tnat state, assets (as reserves) sufficient to cover outstanding losses,
justifies the deduction of this reserve as one required by law to be maintained.
But, in commenting on that case, the court in the instant case says that the
findings supply no adequate ground for a holding contrary to the general doc-
trine theretofore approved in MeCoach t,. Ins. Co., supra.
It would seem that the decision in the principal case is the correct one.
The force of an express provision of a revenue law should not be controlled
or abridged by consideration of the provision of a state statute, for if the dif-
fering rules of taxation among the states were to be followed the federal stat-
ute would not work uniformly throughout the domain in which it is to operate.
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Roston R. Co. v. U. S., 265 Fed. 578 (C. C. A., 192). Furthermore, there is a
specific provision in the Act of i916, supra, for deducting all losses actually sus-
tained within the year and not compensated by insurance or otherwise. This is
another indication that losses in immediate contemplation, but not as yet actually
sustained, were not inended to be treated as part of the reserve funds.
INSOLVENCY-AsSIGNMENTS FOR BENEFIT OF CanrroXS-VLn'rrY OF STIP-
ULATION FOR RE.LAs-E-The officers of a corporation became personally liable
for the debts thereof through failure to comply with certain statutes. In a suit
by the creditors to enforce this liability, the defendants plead an agreement by
the creditors to release them from all liability in consideration of an assignment
of all the corporate property for their benefit. Held: Such an assignment is
void. Simmons Hardware Co. v. Rhodes, 7 Fed. (2d) 352 (C. C. A., 1925).
It is very generally held that an assignment by a debtor of part of his
property for the benefit of creditors, with a stipulation for his release from
further liability is fraudulent and void. Cases cited in 5 C. J. 1107; 14 COL. L.
Rzv. 528 (1914). But as to the validity of an assignment by a debtor of all
his property for the benefit of his creditors, with a similar stipulation, there is a
decided conflict of opinion. In England, such a provision in an assignment for
the release of the debtor has been upheld even against a claim of the Crown.
King v. Watson, 3 Exch. 6 (1817) ; Janes v. Whifebread, 20 L 3. C. P. (N.
S.) 217 (185) ; 2 KENT, Comm. 693 (1851).
In the United States, however, the weight of authority has, within recent
years, unquestionably inclined toward holding such assignments invalid. Seale
v. Vaiden, io Fed. 831 (D. C., i881) ; Nelson v. Harper, 122 Ark. 39, 182 S. W.
519 (xgi6). Some of the reasons generally assigned for their invalidity are
that they operate as a method of compelling the creditors to give up some of their
rights; May v. Walker, 35 Minn. 194,28 N. W. 252 (1886) ; see Halsey v. Whit-
ney, Fed. Cas. No. 5964 (1825) ; that the debtor is driving a bargain for his own
benefit since he is absolutely discharged from his debts; Hubbard v. McNaugh-
ton, 43 Mich. 22o, 5 N. W. 293 (i88o); Grover v. Wakeman, ti Wend. 187
(N. Y., 1833) ; that such an assignment will, in effect, result in a discharge of
the debtor from his liabilities on better terms than insolvent laws permit to
debtors applying for this benefit; Sperry v. Gallaher, -7 Iowa 107, 41 N. W.
586 (x88g) ; Henderson v. Bliss, 8 Ind. ioo (1856); that it is contrary to the
doctrine that payment of part of a debt, in the absence of any dispate as to
the amount due, is no consideration for the release of the whole. Henderson
v. Bliss, supra.
Courts upholding such assignments have done so on the ground that since
a debtor has a right to prefer certain creditors, he may prefer those who shall
give him a release. Joel Bailey Datis Co. v. Augustus, ios Va. 843, $4 S. E.
985 (i9o6) ; McMillan v. Holley, 145 Wis. 6x7, 13o N. V. 455 (1911). Chief
Justice Marshall and Judge Story, both with a great deal of reluctance, upheld
these assignments on the ground of stare decisis. Brashear v. West, 7 Pet. 615
(U. S., 1833) ; Halsey v. Whitney, supra. In other jurisdictions, such releases
are authorized or required by statute. Kellog v. Cayce, 84 Tex. 213, 19 S. W.
388 (1892); McCord-Brady Co. v. Mills, 8 Wyo. 258, 6 Pac. 1oo3 (i8g).
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Pennsylvania long uph,.d such assignments with stipulations for releases.
Brashear v. ;'est, s-upra; Sheephanks v. Cohen, 14 S. & M 35. (Pa2 1825);
Mechanics Bank v. Gorman, 8 W. & S. 3o4 (Pa., 1844). But they have since
been made void by statute. Act of :849, P. L. 412, § 4, Pa. St. 192o, § 12072.
The decision in the instant case is not only in accoid with the weight of
authority and, it is submitted, the better view, but is also eminently just, since
there was an attempt there to make this assignment in order to avoid a liability
imposed by statute.
1xsrcA.E OF AUTOMOBILES-RE17CATION OF LICENSE FOR WRrriNG 
OF
1ou2cIs OUTSIDE STATE-The Palmetto Fire Insurance Company, a South Caro-
lina Corporauon, by contract with the Chrysler Sales Corporation, insured all
Chrysler cars against fire and theft The contract of insurance was made "to
Woom it may concern" and was aelivered to the Chrysler Company in Detroit.
A certificate of insurance is sent to the retail purchaser when he has bought the
car. The insurance Company was licensed to carry on insurance business in
Ohio and New York. In each of these states, the Insurance Commissioner
moved to revoke its license, and the company filed a bill to enjoin him from so
doing. Held: (in Ohio) Injunction denied; revocation permitted. Palmetto
Insurance Co. v. Corn, United States District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio, Eastern Division, November 13, ,925; (in New York) injunction
granted; revocation prevented. Palmetto insurance Co. v. Beha, United States
District Coit for the Southern District of New York, November 10, i925.
A State has the power to regulate insurance companies. Nat. Uxioa F. I.
Co. v. Wanberg, 233 U. S. 389 (1913) ; People v. Formosa, 131 N. Y. 478, 30
N. E. 492 (1892) ; Commonwealth v. U'rooman, 164 Pa. 3o6, 3o At. 217 (1894).
It may require a foreign corporation to take out a license or certificate, and
may impose upon the license such terms or conditions as it may wish, provided
the terms are not unconstitutional. New York L. L Co. v. Cravens, 178 U. S.
389 (igoo); Commonwealth v. Maryland Fidelity Co., 244 Pa. 67 at P. 71,
go AtL 437 at p. 439 (1914); Pa. Act of 1921, P. L. 682, Art. III § 301, Pa,
St Supp. x924 § x249ob-3oi. The license, if granted, may be revoked by the
Insurance Commissioner who granted it, but his act may not be arbitrary,
Peo::le v. Insurance Commissioner. 25 Mich. 321 (1872); State v. Harty, 276
Mc '- 2,38 S. N. 835 (xgiS); Pa. Act of 1921, P. L. 789, Art. V § 5o!,
Pa. St. 4upp. -.924 § x2490a-sox. Violations of the laws of the State or of
the conditions attached to the license constitute valid reasons for revocation.
The question in these cases was whether the act of the Commissioner was ar-
bitrary.
The Ohio General Code (i91o) § 5438 provides that nc, insurance com-
pany may write policies on property in that State, unless they are counter-
signed by an authorized Ohio agent, so that the State may tax them. The
writing of this insurance in Michigan on automobiles which would eventually
become property in Ohio, was a violation of this law and the revocation was
proper. In New York, there was no such statute and, since the business was
a lawful one, the mere loss of revenue to the State was no reason for revoca-
tion. The act of the Commissioner was held arbitrary and was enjoinedL.
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The Ohio statute referred to all insurance companies. The Pa. Act of
igx, P. L 682, Art. V § 5oi, Pa. St. Supp. 1924 § i249ob-Sox is almost identi-
cal with the Ohio statute except that it applies to fire insurance companies only.
But since the insurance sold by this company is partly against fire, it would
come under this statute, and were this case to arise in Pennsylvania, it would
probably be decided in accord with the Ohio decision.
This novel insurance idea has occasioned considerable litigation. New de-
velopments will be discussed in the next issue.
SALEs-FuNGIBLE GOOns-PAssAGE OF Tin.E-A, having 618 quarters of
maize in defendant's warehouse, sold and gave a delivery order for 2oo quar-
ters to W, who resold and gave a delivery order to the plaintiffs. A ordered
defendants to stop delivery and the plaintiffs bring this action for the goods
and for damages for non-delivery on the ground that there had been a sale to
them of the 2oo quarters. Held: Judgment for defendants. Laurie v. Dudin,
119251 2 K. B. 383.
The case of Whitehouse v. Frost, 12 East 614 (Eng., i8io) held upon sim-
ilar facts that there was a sale. But the language of later cases disapproved
that decision, although not clearly overruling it, the later cases being distin-
guished either on the ground that something remained to be done to the goods
by the seller or on some other ground not always made clear in the cases.
Wallace t,. Breeds, 13 East 522 (Eng., 1811) ; Austin v. CraVen, 4 Taunt. 644
(Eng., 1812). But Whitehouse v. Frost, supra, has long been regarded as
having no weight in England and the instant case leaves no room for doubt
upon that question.
The trend of the American cases, beginning with the leading case of
Kimberly v. Patchin, ig N. Y. 330 (1859), has been to allow the passage of
title to a part of an undivided mass of fungible goods, where the intention of
the parties is that title to the portion sold shall pass, the vendee becoming tenant
in common of the whole mass with the vendor. Cushing z'. Breed, 96 Mass.
376 (1867); Westinghouse Co. v. Harris, 237 Pa. 2o3, 85 At]. 78 (1912);
Geoghegan v. Arbuckle, 139 Va. 92, 123 S. E. 387 (1924). This view is codi-
fied in the Uniform Sales Act, § 6, and is not only a better interpretation of the
intent of the parties but also is better adapted to the convenience of trade than
is the English view.
STATUTE OF FAs--ORAx. A EMENT To REPURcHAs E STocx-PAzr
PERFORMANCE BY SALE-Plaintiff, by written order, purchased stock of a cor-
poration, through the defendant, its agent and managing officer, in reliance upon
the defendant's oral agreement to repurchase if plaintiff became dissatisfied.
The stock was paid for and delivered. Plaintiff became dissatisfied, but defend-
ant refused to repurchase. Held: The agreement was part of the original con-
tract and the payment for and delivery of the stock took it out of the Statute
of Frauds, Sales Act of 1915, P. L. 543, § 4, Pa. St. i92o, § 19652. Roberts v.
Cauffel, 6 Pa. D. & C. 706 (July, 1924).
The case was affirmed in 283 Pa. 64, 128 At. 67o (March, 1925), but 14
of the Sales Act was not considered, having been declared unconstitutional in
RECENT CASES
Guppy v. Moltrup, 281 Pa. 343, 126 Ati. 766 (November, 19a4). By Act of
1925, P. L. 310, § 4 of the Sales Act was amended so as to safisfy the constitu-
tional objection. Thus the decision of the present case becomes of practical
interest.
The weight of authority favors the enforcement of such oral agreements,
but the cases advance two distinct theories. In one line of decisions, where the
vendor is owner of the stock, it is held that the oral agreement is part of the
original contract, but payment for and delivery of the stock takes the contract
out of the Statute of Frauds. Kuntzmann v. Petteys, 74 Colo. 342, 221 Pac.
888 (i93) ; Armstrong v'. Orler. 220 Mass. 112, xo7 N. E. 392 (i91); John-
son v. Trask, 116 N. Y. 136, 22 N. E. 377 (1889).
Another line of decisions, wherein the defendant acted only as agent, but
was an officer in the corporation whose stock he sold, adopts the theory that
the oral agreement to repurchase is in the nature of a contract of indemnity,
and as such is not embraced in the Statute of Frauds. Schoeffer v. Streider
203 Mass. 467, 89 N. E. 618 (igog) ; Trenholm v. Kloepper, 88 Neb. 236, z29 N.
W. 436 (191!); Lingelbach v. Lukenbach, x68 Wis. 481, 17o N. W. 711 (1919).
Since the facts of the present case fall within the second group of cases,
it would seem that the theory adopted is opposed to that followed in the ma-
jority of decisions on similar facts.
TRUSTS-RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES-MAINTENANCE OF' MEMORIALS-
The testator bequeathed iioooo to trustees of a Masonic temple erected by him
as a memorial to his son, the income to be used for "the maintenance and up-
keep of the said Masonic temple--and the balance (if any) to be applied" to
Masonic charities. Held: Entire gift void. In re Porter, [1925] I Ch. 746.
The trustees argued that, the temple being a memorial, the principle of
the "tomb" cases applied by which the first part of the gift failing as a per-
petuity, the whole gift should go to the charities. The court said a memorial
is not a tomb, and refusing to extend the doctrine, avoided the whole bequest.
An American case with similar facts, involving a Masonic bequest, is in
accord. Mason v. Perry, 22 R. I. 475, 48 Atl. 671 (zgox).
Some American cases have held that the Masons are a charitable institution;
Savannah v. Solomon's Lodge, 53 Ga. 93 (1874) ; Indianapolis v. Grand Lodge,
25 Ind. si8 (z865) ; but the weight of authority is the other way. Bangor v.
Masonic Lodge, 73 Me. 428 (1882); Mason v. Perry, supra.
The rule against perpetuities can be avoided, and a bequest such as the
above enforced, by a bequest to a charity on condition that the building be main-
tained, with a gift over to another charity in case of default. In re Tyler,
[i8gi] L. L 3 Ch. 252.
In the principal case it might have been argued that a memorial is a
charity, and that therefore the entire gift was valid. Smith's Estate, Walker's
Appeal, 18x Pa. 109, 37 Ad. 114 (1897), where the court said: "The memorial
monument is for the beautifying and adornment of the city, and for these rea-
sons alone the gift would be upheld as charitable."
The case is interesting because of the refusal to extend the "tomb" cases
doctrine, mid also because no argument was based on the memorial character
of the temple making it a charitable use.
